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obtain the treatment on their own.
A clinícal trial with partial compliance is sometimes referred to as
randomizatíon of "intention-to-treat" (Efron and Feldman 1991.) In his
discussion of the Powers and Swinton (1984) test preparatíon study, Holland
(1988) refers to the randomizatíon of encouragement or assístance as an
"encouragement design." The smoking study by Permutt and Hebel also fits into
this category. Each of these examples is actually a special case of the
instrumental variables framework widely used ín observational studies in
econometrics. In estímation based on the draft lottery, the randomly assigned
lottery number is an instrument foz whether men born in certain years served
in the military. More generally, instrumental variables techniques can be
used to evaluate the effect of an intervention whenever a variable can be
found (the "instrwoent") chat is associated with the outcome of interest
solely by virtue of its associatíon with treatment assignment.
Whether couched in thr, econometrícian's language of instrumental
variables or not, most of the literature on causal effects in evaluation
research is concerned with estimating the average effect of a binary
treatment. Since Rubin's (1974, 1977) influential formulatíon of the problem
of causal ínference, causal effects in statistics have usually been defined as
the average difference between the outcomes of the treated and what these
outcomes would have been in the absence of treatment (Holland 1986).1 In a
recent paper (Imbens and Angrist 1991), we extend the definition of causal
1See, for example, Heckman (1990), Manski (1991), and Angrist and Imbens
(1991). Rubin (1974, 1977) and Angrist (1991b) are concerned with the average
causal effect of binary treatment in an entire population. Heckman and Robb
(1985) discuss both of these types of causal effects in the context of linear
econometríc models. An important early formulation of the problem of causal
ínference is Roy (1951).1. Introduction
For a variety of ethícal and practical reasons, empirical researchers
have long been interested in alternatives to evaluation designs based on
random assigruoent. In medicine, the uae of random assignment to evaluate drug
effícacy and medical interventions may require that potentially beneficíal
treatments be denied to seriously ill patíents. Some physiclans argue that
denial of a potentially beneficial treatment violates the "Patient Care
Principle" in medical ethics (Royall 1991). In the social aciences,
randomization of treatment raises some of the same ethical issues as in
medicine, and may be impractical because of cost considerations, or because of
political resistance to the randomization of social policy interventions
(Manski and Garfinkel 1991.)
Although random assignment of treatment is often represented as an ideal
research design, credible alternative designs and statistical methodologies
may be available. Hearst, Newman, and Hulley (1986) used the randomly
assigned prtority for conscription generated by the Vietnam-era draft lottery
to estimate the effects of military service on the subaequent mortality of
veterans. Angrist (1990) used the lottery to atudy the effect of mílitary
service on the civilian earnings of veterans. In a study of the effects of
test-preparation on Graduate Record Examination (GRE) scorea, a randomly
chosen group of test-takers was encouraged, but not compelled, to prepare in
advance for the GRE (Powers and Swinton 1984.) A fourth example is a study of
the effect of maternal smokíng on birth weight, in which a randomly selected
sample of pregnant amokers was enrolled ín a course designed to encourage
participants to reduce or quit smoking (Permutt and Hebel 1984, 1989.)
Finally, in clinícal trials, patíents randomly assigned to the treatment group
may decline treatment, and some members of the control group may be able toAverage Causal Rasponse with Variable Treatment Intensity
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In evaluation research, an average causal effect is usually defined as
the expected difference between the outcomes of the treated, and what these
outcomes would have been ín the absence of treatment. Thia definition of
causal effects makes sense for binary treatments only. In this paper, we
extend the definitíon of average causal effects to the case of variable
treatments such as drug dosage, hours of exam preparation, cigarette smoking,
and years of schooling. We show that given mild regularity assumptíons,
instrumental variables índependence assumptions identify a weighted average of
per-unit causal effects along the length of an appropriately defined causal
response function. Conventional instrumental variables and Two-Stage I.east
Squares procedures can be interpreted as estimating the average causal

















effects to include the notion of a Local Average Treatment Effect (IATE).
IATE is the average effect of treatment for those whose treatment status is
affected by exogenous variation in some third variable. For example, ín the
smoking study, IATE is the average effect of maternal smoking on birth weight
for babies whose mothers quit or reduced their smoking as a consequence of
counseling and assistance. In the test-preparation study, IATE is the effect
of test preparation for students whose studying behavior was ínfluenced by the
randomly assigned encouragement intervention. Finally, ín Angrist's (1990)
study of the draft lottery, 1ATE is the effect of veteran status for men who
served in the military as a consequence of their draft lottery number.
In our previous paper, we showed that LATE for a binary treatment is
identified under a mild regularity condition satisfied in a wide range of
models and circumstances. Essentially, this condítion requires that the
instrumental variable affect treatment status in a monotone way. In the draft
lottery example, we require that men with lottery numbers putting them at risk
of conscríption are at least as likely to serve as they would have been had
they had lottery numbers exempting them from conscríption.z When the
monotonícity condition is satisfied, IATE is identified and can be estimated
using conventional línear instrumental variables and Two-Stage Least Squares
(TSLS) estimators.
The purpose of this paper ís to extend the definition of LATE and the
corresponding identifícation and estimation results to the case of variable
treatments. For example, instead of estimating the effect of a certain drug
ZCígarette smoking is not a binary treatment and so LATE is not defined
in the Permutt and Hebel (1989) smoking study. But the monotonicity condition
can still be defined; it requires that women given anti-smoking counseling
smoke no more than they would have without the counseling. Permutt and Nebel
suggest this condition in an informal discussion of their results.4
treatment regime on health, we are interested in estimating features of the
entire dose-response function. The methodological points are illustrated
through two empirical examples. Fírst, we briefly discuss the results ín
Powers and Swinton's (1984) study of encouraged preparation for the GRE. Our
second illustration is based on a study of compulsory school attendance by
Angrist and Krueger ( 1991), which showed how compulsory attendance laws
interact with students' quarter of bírth to induce exogenous variation in
years of schooling. Angrist and Krueger used this exogenous variation in
schooling to estimate the effect of schooling in econometric earnings
functíons. The causal effect ídentified in each of these examples is a
weighted average of points along the response function that would be
identified if treatment were randomly assigned.
2. Causal Effects
To fíx ideas, we continue to refer to the study of the effect of test
preparation on GRE scores. The intervention in this case was the mailing by
the Educational Testing Service of test-preparatíon materíals such as practice
exams, and a strongly worded letter designed to encourage the use of these
materials. The treatment of interest, however, was not the receipt of
preparation materials or the encouragement to use them, but the actual number
of hours of preparation.
Let Y~ E 7t be the exam score given j hours of preparation, for j- 0,
1, 2, .. , J. We assume that the Y~ are well-defined and that a full set
exists for each person, even though only one of the Y~ is actually observed.
We also define Dy E(0, 1, 2, .. , K) for Z E(0, 1) to be the number of
hours of preparation by a test candidate conditional on the índícator for5
whether he or she received encouragement, Z. As with Y~, Dy is assumed to
exist for each value of Z for each person even though only one Dy is observed.
This setup i s an ínnovation to the framework outlined by Rubin (1974, 1977)
because the Rubin framework is limited to counter-factual outcomes and binary
treatments.
Note that Yo is the test score of someone who doesn't prepare for the
GRE. One of the causal effects we are interested in is Y1 - Yo, the effect
of preparing one hour rather than zero hours. Given Jtl levels of treatment,
there are (Jtl x J)~2 possible treatment effects, Y~-Yi, each of which can be
expressed in terms of the J línearly independent treatment effects for a unít
increase in treatment level, Y~ - Y~-1. The sequence of Y~ - Y~-1 defines the
true causal response function for each individual.
If the treatment level, D, is randomly assigned, then E[Y~ - Y~-1] can
be estimated by subtracting the average response for individuals with
treatment level j-1 from the average response for individuals with treatment
level j. We assume that the level of treatment (hours of preparation) is not
randomly assígned, but determined at least partly on the basis of ínformatíon
unavailable to the researcher. Because this informatíon may also be related
to outcomes, comparísons of average outcomes for different treatment levels do
not consistently estimate the effect of a unit increase ín treatment.
Initially we assume that Z can take on only two values, 0 and 1,
indícating assignment to the encouragement íntervention or not.3 Do is the
hours of preparation when not encouraged and D1 is the hours of preparation íf
encouraged. For each person in the sample of test candidates, we observe the
3The test-preparation study involved the random assignment of 4 different
types of preparatíon materials as well as encouragement to prepare for the
test, in a 5 x 2 factorial design.6
triple (Z,D,Y), where Z is the level of encouragement, D- DL - Z. D1 t
(1 - Z) - Do is the hours of preparation, and Y- Yp is the candidate's
test score. Our principal identifyíng assumptíon (apart from assuming the
exístence of Yy) is that Z is independent of all potential outcomes and
potential treatment intensitíes. In the test-prgparation example, this
assumption ís satísfied because encouragement is randomly assigned. Formally,
we have:
Assumptíon 1 (Independence).
The random varíables Do, D1, Yo, Y1, .. , Y~ are jointly índependent of Z.
It is important to note that this assumption alone is not enough to
identify a meaningful average treatment effect. Example 1 in Imbens and
Angrist (1991) shows that treatment effect heterogeneity can make comparísons
of people by interventíon status (Z) meaningless. In this example E[YI Z],
E[YID], and E[Y~ D, Z] are all constant even though E[DI Z] varies wíth Z and
the treatment effect for every individual is strictly positive. Therefore,
there is no way to estimate an average treatment effect from the observed
distribution of Y. The intuition for the result in this example is that whíle
the instrument causes a large group of people with small treatment effects to
shift from non-treatment to treatment, a small group wíth large treatment
effects is induced to leave treatment. On average, effects in the two groups
cancel each other out even though the instrument is correlated wíth trentmen[
status and all treatment effects are positive.
The most common way to get around this problem is simply to assume a
constant treatment effect, Ys - Y~-1 - a for all j and all indíviduals.7
This is the assumption underlyíng most econometric applícations using linear
regressíon models, as well as the application of instrumental variables
techniques by Permutt and Hebel (1989). In hís comment on Holland's (1988)
discussion of causality, l.eamer ( 1988) points out that given an independence
assumption such as Assumption 1, the problem of causal inference ís trivial in
linear models with constant treatment effects. We believe the importance of
the Rubin's "counter-factual" approach to causal inference is that in this
framework, trpatment effect heterogeneity arisas naturally from the assumptíon
of counter-factual individual outcomea. Use of a model with hetezogeneous
treatment effects therefore helps clarify the definition of causalíty that
motivates evaluation research.~
Instead of restricting treatment effect heterogeneity, in this paper we
lmpose a non-parametric restriction on the process determining D as a function
of Z.5 This restriction can be characterized in the test-preparation example
as follows: We can allow the encouragement íntervention to lead to different
increases ín test-preparation time for different people, and we can allow the
interventíon to have no effect for some people. But we assume that the
intervention never leads to fewer hours of test preparation. More generally,
we make the following monotonicity asaumption:
~Aigner and Zellner (1988), Holland (1986), and Rubin (1990) survey
alternatíve frameworks for causal inference.
SElsewhere (Angrist and Imbens 1991), we discuss bounds on treatment
effects attainable by imposíng a pziorí restrictions on the difference between
two alternative weíghted average treatment effects. A varíety of other
results on non-parametric bounds for treatment effects are given by Manski
(1992.)8
Assumption 2 (Monotonicity).
Pr(D~ - Do ~ 0) - 1 or Pr(D1 - Da 5 0) - 1.
This means that either D1 - Do 7 0 for each person or D1 - Do 5 0 for each
person. Assumption 2 is not verifiable, sínce it involves unobserved
varíables (only one of D1 or po is observed.) Nevertheless, if J 1 1,
Assumption 2 has the testable implícation that the cumulative distributíon
function (CDF) of D given Z- 1 and the CDF of D given Z-0 should not
cross.b If J- 1, the CDF's cannot cross because the treatment is binary.
In section 4, below, we compare empirical CDF's gíven Z in two examples.
The main theoretical result of the paper is given below for the case
where D1 - Do ~ 0:
Theorem 1. Suppose that assumptions 1 and 2 hold and that Pr(D1 ~ j~ Do)
~ 0 for at least one j. Then,
E[YIZ-1]-E[YIZ-0] J
(1) - E ~~ ~ E[Y~ - Yi-i~ Di ? j ~ Do] - ~
E[D~Z-1]-E[D~Z-0] j-1
where





which implies that 0 S c.i~ 5 1 and E m~ - 1,
j-1
so that ~ is a weíghted average per-unit treatment effect that can be
estímated from a sample of (Y, D, Z).
6If D1 7 Do then Pr(D1 ~ j) ~ Pr(Da ~ j) for all j. This implies Pr(D ~
j~ Z-1) ~ Pr(D ~ jl Z-0) or Fp(j~ Z-0) ~ Fp(j~ Z-1) where Fp is the CDF of D.9
Proof: Let I(A) be the indicator function for the event A. Define the
following índicators: 6y3 - I(Dy - j) for Z- 0,1 and j- 0,1,...,J; and ay3 -
I(Dy ~ j) for Z- 0,1 and j- 0,1,2,...,Jf1. Note that ayo - 1 and ayJtl - o
for all Z. The indicators ó and a are related by the equations ay3 - ïi-3 óy3
and 6y3 - ay3 - az3ti for Z- 0,1 and j- 0,1,...,J.
In terms of the óy3, Y can be written as:
J J
Y- Z ' Yo t(1 - Z) ' Yo -( Z- E YS ~ ói3) }~(1 - Z). E YS . 603 ) ~ o j-o j-o
Therefore,
EIYIZ - 11 - E(Y~ Z- o]
J J
- E ( E YS ~ ó13 ~ Z - 1 )- E l S YS . ó03 I Z- 0 )
j-o j-o
Usíng the independence assumption, this can be written
J
E ( E YS - [ó~3 - ó031 )
j-o
J
- E I E YS '
j -0
J
- E I E [ (YS
[a13 - ai3ti - aoJ } ~o3ti1 1




- E ( E (YS - YS-1) ' (a13 - an3) 1
j-1
because ayo - 1 for Z- 0,1. Now, note that a13 ? ao3 by assumptíon 2 and that
a13 and ao3 equal zero or one. Therefore, a13 - ao3 equals zero or one, and we10
can write the previous expression as
J
S E[Y3 - Ya-~ ~a~~ - aoj - 11 ' Pr(al~ - ao~ - 1)
j-1
J
(2) - E E[Y.i - YJ-i I DI ~ j 7 Doj . Pr(Dl 1 j~ Do).
j-1
Now we turn to the denominator of (1):
J J




E[DIz - 1] - E[DIz - o] - E(E j. ól~ ~Z - 1 1- E 1 E j' áo~~ z- ol .
j-o j-o
Again, usíng the independence assumption, this equals
J
- E ( E j ~ (ál~ - áo,~) ) .
j-o
Substituting for az~ - az~,l for ó~y this can be rewritten as
E
J J
( E j ~(a~~ - a~~,~ - ao~ t ao~t~)1 - E I s(a~a - ao~) )
j-o j-1
J
- E Pr(D1 ~ j ~ Do).
j-1
The requirement that Pr(D1 ~ j~ Do) ~ 0 for some j means that the
instrument must affect the level of treatment, D. Also, note that in the
proof of T'heorem 1, D is assumed to take on only integer values between 0
and J. The only restriction necessary, however, ís that D be bounded and
take on a finite number of rational values. Then one can always use a linear
transformation to ensure that D takes on only integer values between 0 and J.11
A linear transformation of D does not have any effect on the numerator of the
ACR. The denominator is multiplled by a constant. The linear transformation
therefore amounts to changing the units in which treatment intensity is
measured.
Theorem 1 ís important because it shows that in a wide variety of models
and circumstances, it is possible to identify features of the distribution of
Y~ - Y~-1. For example, the monotonicity assumption appears plausible in
research designs based on the draft lottery, and in desígns based on randomly
assigned encouragement or intention-to-treat; the monotonicity assumption is
also mechanically satisfied in the latent index models commonly employed in
econometrics (Imbens and Angzist 1991.) We refer to the parameter ~ as the
Average Causal Response (ACR.) This parameter captures a weighted average of
causal responses to a unit change in treatment, for those whose treatment
status is affected by the instrument. Note that this group need not be
representative of the population.
The weight attached to the average of Y~ - Y~-1 is proportional to the
number of people who, because of the instrument, change their treatment from
less than j units to j or more uníts. This proportion is Pr(D1 ~ j~ Do).
In the test-preparation example, this is the proportion of people who study at
least j hours when encouraged, but would study less than j hours if not
encouraged. These weights can be estimated using a random sample of (Y,D,Z)
because
Pr(Dl ~ j ~ Do) - E(ai~ - ao,~)
- Pr(Di ? j) - Pr(Do ~ j) - Pr(Do C j) - Pr(D1 ~ j)
- Pr(D ~ j~ Z-0) - Pr(D ~ j~ Z-1).12
Thus, the weighting function is just the difference between the empirical
CDF's of D given 2.
A natural estimator of ~ is the sample analog of the left hand side of
(1). This estimator ís an application of Wald's (1940) grouping method of
fitting straight lines, where the data have been grouped by the ínstrument.
Durbin (1954) appears to have been the first to point out that the Wald
estímator is also an instrumental variables estímator.
We conclude this section with a corollary that can be used to interpret
parameter estimates in models where a variable treatment is incorrectly
parameterized as a binary treatment. For example, Permutt and Hebel (1989)
discuss conditions sufficient to ídentífy the effect of smoking when it is
assumed that all that matters for health ís whether any cigarettes are smoked.
Similarly, econometrícians sometimes estimate the effect of college and~or
hígh school graduation on earnings, ignoríng the fact that dummy variables
indícating graduation are nonlinear functions of an underlying years-of-
schooling variable (e.g., Rosen and Willis 1979.)
The corollary is based on the smoking example, and shows that Wald
estimates constructed by treating cigarette-smoking as a binary treatment have
a probability limit proportional to the ACR. The factor of proportionality is
greater than or equal to one.
Corollary (Mis-specífied binary treatment.) Suppose that the treatment of
interest is assumed to be an indicator function of D, say d~ azl -
I(Dz ~ 1). Then, given Assumptions 1 and 2,
E(YIZ-1]-EjYI2'0]
(3) EIdIZ`1]-EIdIZ:O] - ~ ' ~ - ~.13
where
J
E Pr(D1 ~ j ~ Do)
E[DIZ-1] - E[D~Z-Oj j-1
~ - - ~
E[dIZ-1) - F.[dl2-Oj Pr(D1 ~ 1~ D~)
so that ~ ~ 1.
Proof: To establish the formula for ~, note that the numerator ia the same
as in Theorem 1. The denominator can be written
E[aii~ Z-11 - E[aoi~ Z-O1 - E[aii - aai] - Pr(DI ~ 1~ Do).
That m ~ 1 is immediate from the formula for ~. In fact, the only situatíon
where ~- 1 is when then the instrument has no effect other than to cause
people to switch from D - 0 to D- 1. ~
Thus, when a variable treatment is incorrectly parameterized as binary, the
resulting estímate tends to be too large relative to the average per-unit
effect along the length of the response function. On the other hand, the sign
of the ACR is still identified. Thís result ís similar to the conventional
omitted-variables bias formula in a regression where the omítted variables are
actually functions of the treatment intensity other than the indicator
function, d.
3. Multiple Instruments
In many empirícal applications, a number of instrumental variables are
available. For example, the experíment desígned to encourage test preparation14
involved the random assígnment of 5 different types of test preparation
material ( the fifth type was no material), as well as a letter encouragíng the
use of these materials. The act of sending materials without a letter of
encouragement also led to an íncrease in hours of exam preparation. Assuming
that both encouragement and the sending of materials have no effect other than
to increase the number of hours of preparation, the interaction of 5 types of
preparation materíal with the encouragement letter in a factorial design
generates 9 potential instrumental varíables.
The typícal econometric applícation of instrumental variables techniques
imposes a constant-treatment-effect model, in which Y3 - Y~-1 - a for all j
and all individuals. In this case, alternative instrumental variables
estimates of the same a can be combined ínto a single more efficíent
estímate using Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS.) In fact, one interpretation of
TSLS in the constant treatment effect model is that it is an instrumental
variables estímator where the instrument being used is the fítted value from a
regression of D on all the possible instruments.
The díscussion in the previous section suggests [hat estimates of ~
constructed usíng different instruments should be expected to differ. This is
because different instruments are associated with different weightíng schemes
in the definition of the ACR. What does the TSLS estimator -- which combines
alternative instrumental variables estimates -- produce when ít ís applied to
the heterogeneous-treatment-effects model outlined in Section 2? We explore
thís question for the case where K mutually orthogonal binary instruments
are combined to form a single TSLS estimate. This is a faírly general example
because any set of discrete ínstruments can be recoded as a set of mutually
exclusive indicator variables. Alternately, TSLS using K orthogonal15
indicators can be thought of as a means of exploiting a single Ktl-valued
instrument, W. For example, in the test-preparation experíment, W indexes
the 10 treatment and control groups.
In general, a Ktl-valued ínstrument can be used to form (Ktl)xK~2
ACR's, defined as:
E[YI W-k] - E[YI W-t]
~~ - for k f P.
E[DI W-k] - E[DI W-1],
We assume that each underlyíng bínary ínstrument affects treatment the so that
the denominators are non-zero. Only K of the ~~ are linearly independent
and the different ACR's are related as follows:
E[D~ W-k] - E[D~ W-m] E[DI W-m] - E[DI W-E]
~k~ - ~ } Qme .
E[DI W-k] - EIDI W-P] EIDI W-k] - E[D~ W-P]
Theorem 2 below shows that the TSLS estimator constructed by using K
linearly independent dummy variables, ók - I(W - k), plus a constant as
ínstruments is a weighted average of the K linearly independent ACR's, ~k,k-1~
Since each of the ~,k-1 is a weighted average of points on the causal
response function, the TSI.S estimate also converges to a weighted average of
points on the causal response function.
l,et the polnts of support of W be ordered auch that Q c m lmplies
E[D~ W-f] ~ E[D~ W-m]. Flnally, note that uaing K dummíes, 6k - I(W - k),
plus a constant ín TSLS estimation is the same thing as instrumental variables
estimation using E[DI WJ plus a constant as instruments. Then we have:16
Theorem 2. Suppose that E(DI WJ and a constant are used as instruments to
construct instrumental variables estimates of ~ in the equation
(4) Y- 7 t~D t c.
The resulting estimate has probability limit
(S) 9w ~
EIY . (E[DI W] - E[D])) K
` ~ 1~k~k,k-3 ~
E~E[DIW] - (E[D~W] - E[D])) k-1
where F~k - (EIDIW-kl - E[DIW'k-1]) '
K
E x~ (E[DIW-P] - E(D])
P-k
K
E x~ E[DIW-P]CE[DIW'P1 - E[D])
P-0
K
and x~ - Pr[W-P]. Moreover, 1 ~ Wk ~ 0 and E~k - 1.
k-1
Proof: The denominator of the formula for pk is the same as the denominator of
the expression for ~. To evaluate the numerator, we can write
(6) E[Y~ W-P] - ~e,~-3 (E[DIW-P] - E[DIW-P-1]) t E[Y~ W-E-1]
P
- E~k,k-1 (E[DIW-k] - E[DIW-k-1]) t E[YI W-0]
k-1
and
(7) EIY .(E[D~ W] - E[D])) - E(EIYI W'P) '(E[DI W-P] - EÍD])f.
Substitutíng (6) for E[YI W-P] in (7), the numerator is
K P
E E ae(E[DI W-P]-E[D]) ~k.k-i(E[DIW'k]-E[D~W-k-1])
P-0 k-1
K K
E E I(1ckGP) ' x~(E[DI W`P]-E[D]) ~k.k-i(E[DIW`k]-E[DIW-k-1])
P-0 k-1
K K
E E x~(EID~ W-P]-E[DI) ~k.k-3(E[DIW-k]-E[DIW-k-1]).
k-1 P-k17
This establishes the right hand side of (5). The weíghts, p~, are non-
negative because the points of support of W are ordered such that E[DI W-k] ~
E[DI W-k-1]. To show that the weights sum to one, note that the sum of the
numerator of the pk's is
K K
E E x~CEIDI W-P]-EID)) (E[DIW-kI-E[DIW-k-1]).
k-1 P-k
Reversing the order of summation as before, this equals
K P




E(EIDIW-k]-E[DIW-k-1]) - E[DI W-P] - E[DI W-o].
k-1
so that (8) can be written
K
s x~(EIDI W-P]-E[D]) (E[DI W-P] - E[DI W-o]).
P-1
K
E x~ (E[D~ W-P]-E(D]) E(D~W-P]
P-0
K
E x~(E(D~ W-P]-E[D]) E[DI W-0] --xo(E[DI W-O]-E[D]) E[DI W-0]
P-1
Expression (9) is the same as the denominator of {~. ~
Theorem 2 provídes a useful interpretation for conventional TSLS
estimates. Just as the simple Wald estimator of Theorem 1 provides a weighted
average effect along the length of the causal reaponse functíon, TSLS
estimates provide one way of combiníng a set of different weighted average18
effects into a new weighted average.
One reason for reportíng TSLS estimates as well as Wald estimates is
that the TSLS estimate may have lower sampling variance than any síngle Wald
estimate. The TSLS estimate also provides a summary statistic that combines
estimates based on different weighting schemes. However, standard errors for
TSLS estimates in the model outlined here should take account of the fact that
there is a different treatment effect for each inatrument. In practice, this
means that the TSLS residual (Y - y-~D) is likely to be heteroscedastic
(conditional on 2). White (1982) provides a heteroscedastícity-consistent
covariance-matrix estimator that can be used in this case.
TSLS estimators are usually associated with an over-identification test
statistic that equals the objective function implicitly minimized by the
estimates (Newey 1985). In a constant-treatment-effect model estimated by
TSLS, the statistic provides an over-ídentífication test for the null
hypothesis that all the instruments are orthogonal to the regression error
term. The constant treatment effect is over-identified because any síngle
instrument would be suffícient for identification. But in the model outlined
here, ít no longer makes sense to talk about over-identification; in
principle, each instrument can lead to a different estimate even though all
the instruments satisfy the independence assumption. In fact, Theorem 1
provides one explanation for why estimates of causal effects such as the
return to schoolíng may differ in different studies.
The conventional TSLS instrument-error orthogonality test statistic may
stíll be worth computing, however, because it provides a summary measure of
how much dífferent weighting schemes affect estimates of the ACR. Angrist
(1991) has shown that when the instruments are a set of mutually exclusive19
dummy variables as in Theorem 2, then the over-identification test statistic
is the same as a Wald statistic for the equalíty of a full set of linearly
independent Wald estimates. In other words, the statístic provides a test of
the null hypothesis Ha: ~K,K-1 -~x-1.K-2 -...~l,o. The Wald statistic
combines the differences between paira of Wald estimates in a quadratic form,
with weighting matrix equal to the inverse of the covaríance matrix of the
estímates.~ In the context of the model outlined here, the test statistic
should be large when there is substantial treatment effect heterogeneity. But
it is important to note that the test statistic may also be large for the same
reason a conventional over-identífication test is failed: some of the
instruments do not satísfy the independence assumptions.
4. Empirical Examples
4.1 Test-Preparation
In this sectíon we discuss estimates of the ACR in two examples. The
fírst is the Powers and Swinton (1984) test-preparation study. Assuming that
the randomly assigned encouragement intervention satisfies independence and
monotonicity restrictions, the experimental data can be used to estimate
features of the causal relationship between test preparation and test scores.
For example, an estimate of the ACR for the effect of test preparation on the
GRE Analytical test score can be computed from data reported in the Powers and
Swinton article. The mean Analytícal score for those who received the letter
encouraging preparation was 531.8 and the mean score for those not encouraged
~Multiple use of the label "Wald" may be confusing here. A Wald estimate
is the sample analog of equation (1). A Wald sta[ístic for the null
hypothesis Ho: B- Bo is the quadratic form: m(B") - n(B`-Bo]'~-1[B`-Bo],
where B` is an estimate of the parameter B in a sample of size n, and ~ is the
limíting covariance matrix of the estimate.20
was 509.7. The mean hours of preparatíon for the Analytical section was 3.37
for those encouraged and 2.8 for those not encouraged. The ratio of the
difference in scores to the difference ín hours of preparation is 38.8, that
is, an average causal score response of 38.6 points per hour of preparation.e
The anatomy of this estimate can be explored usíng data from Table 2 in
Powers and Swinton (1984), which shows the frequency distribution of hours of
preparation for the Analytical GRE according to whether subjects were assigned
to receive encouragement or not. To simplify discussion of the ACR ín this
example, we have assumed that actual hours of preparation can be descríbed by
a discrete variable, D, taking 5 values corresponding to the five intervals
reported by Powers and Swínton. The Powers and Swinton intervals are for the
number preparing 0 hours, positive hours less than 1, 1-2 hours, 3-5 hours,
and 6 or more hours, and are listed in column 1 of Table 1 here. Column 2 of
Table 1 lists the díscrete treatment intensities assumed to correspond to
these intervals; D can be 0 hours, .5 hours, 1.5 hours, 4 hours, or 6 hours of
test preparation.
Column 3 reports the cumulative frequency distríbutions of D by
encouragement status. For example, where Powers and Swinton report the number
preparing 0 hours, columns 3 and 4 record the number preparing less than .5
hours. Note that the empirical CDF of D given no encouragement, Pr(DoGj),
always exceeds the CDF gíven encouragement, Pr(D1Gj). This is a necessary
(but not sufficíent) condition for the monotonicity assumption to be satísfied
BUnder the null hypothesis of no treatment effect, the asymptotic
standard error for the ACR is given by the standard error of the numerator
divided by the denominator (Angrist 1990.) This is 6.96 for the estímate of
38.8 points of GRE-score improvement per hour of study. Standard errors for
the general case must be computed using conventional TSLS formulas requíring
micro data.21
by the encouragement ínterventíon. The ACR weighting function is reported in
column 5. This is simply the difference between columns 3 and 4, normalízed
to sum to 1.
The last two columns of Table 1 show which increases in treatment
intensíty the ACR weights apply to, and which part of the sample is
contributing to the weights. The ACR weíghts act to combine four separate
causal effects: the effect of moving from zero to .5 hrs of study, the effect
of moving from .5 to 1.5 hours of study, the effect of moving from 1.5 to 4
hours of study, and the effect of movíng from 4 to 6 hours of study. The
first effect is weighted by 16.4 percen[, and, as shown in column 7, this
represents the fraction of the sample caused by encouragement to move from
zero to .5 or more hours of study. The bulk of the weight falls on the middle
two treatment effects, for moving from .5 to 1.5 hours of study and from 1.5
to 4 hours of study. The weights here represent the fractíon of the sample
induced to move from less than 1.5 to 1.5 or more hours of study (39.7
percent) and the fraction induced to move from less than 4 to 4 or more hours
of study (33.1 percent.) Only 10.8 percent of those whose treatment status
was affected by the encouragement letter moved from less than 6 to 6 or more
hours of study. This fraction weights the effect of moving from 4 to 6 hours
of study in the computation of the ACR.
Finally, note that Powers and Swinton also compute the regression of the
average GRE Analytical score on the average hours of preparation for each of
the 10 treatment and control groups underlying the test-preparation
experímental design. The coefficient on average hours of test preparation in
thís 10 observation bivariate regressíon is a version of the TSLS estimator22
described in Theorem 2.9 The slope estimate is 30.74 points of GRE-score
improvement. Thís estimate ímplicitly combines the Wald estimate of 38.8
points in a weighted average with the 8 other estimates that can be computed
from pairwise comparisons of treatment and control groups.
4.2 Compulsory School Attendance
In two recent papers, Angrist and Krueger (1991, 1992) show that
students' quarter of bírth interacts with compulsory attendance laws and age
at school entry to generate exogenous varíation in years of completed
schooling. State compulsory attendance laws typically require students to
enter school in the Fall of the year in which they turn six, but allow
students to drop out of school when they reach their 16th birthday. Thís
induces a relationship between quarter of birth and educational attaínment
because students born in the first quarter of the year enter school at an
older age than students born in later quarters. Students who enter school at
an older age are allowed to drop out of school after having completed less
schooling than students who enter school at a younger age.
Angrist and Krueger (1991) estimate the coefficient p in the following
equation:
(10) Y- 7 t pE t e,
9If the grouped regression residual is homoscedastic, then the
coefficient estimated from the bivariate grouped regression is the same as the
TSLS estimate described in Theorem 2. More generally, weíghted least squares
estímation using data grouped by the value of discrete ínstruments is the same
as TSLS estimation in micro data using these ínstruments (Angrist 1991.) The
regressíon weights should equal the reciprocal of the residual variance in the
grouped regression.23
where E is years of schooling and Y is the log of weekly wages.lo The
coefficient p can be interpzeted as a percentage "return" to a year of
schooling and is usually on the order of 6-8 percent in econometric studíes.
But naive eatimation procedures such as comparisona of average earnings by
schooling level or Ordínary Least Squares (OLS) do not necessarily generate
estimates with a causal interpretation. This is because those more educated
may be people who, perhaps because they are more able, would have earned more
even if they had not gotten more schooling.
Theorem 1 shows that even though schoolíng ís not randomly assígned, the
average causal response of earnings to schoolíng can be estimated if there are
instruments avaílable satisfying exclusion and monotonicity conditions. Even
ín the absence of a true experiment, a"natural experiment" may generate
instruments satisfying these conditions. The premise underlying the
estimation strategy ín Angrist and Krueger (1991) is that age at school entry
and compulaory attendance laws interact to generate variatíon in schooling
that is likely to be unrelated to determinants of labor market outcomes other
than educatíon. This exogenous variatíon is then used to construct
instrumental variables estimates of the effect of schooling on earnings. The
instruments are dummy variables indicating quarter of birth.
A simple application of this ídea compares the education and earnings of
men born in the fírst quarter to the education and earnings of inen born in the
fourth quarter. Calculations underlying Wald estimates based on a first
quarter~fourth quarter comparison are laid out in Table 2. Panel A of the
Table shows results tabulated from data on the wages and earnings of inen in
loAngrist and Krueger (1991) estimate variations on thís equation that
include addítional covariates.24
the 1970 Census and Panel B shows results tabulated using data from the 1980
Census. In both data sets, men born in the first quarter earn slightly less
and have slightly less schooling than men born in later quarters. The ratio
of differences in earnings to differences in schooling generates a Wald
estimate of the return to schooling of 5.3 percent using the 1970 Census and
8.9 percent using the 1980 Census. These estimetes are within sampling error
of the OIS estimates of 8 percent and 7 percent in the two Census data sets.
Angrist and Krueger use linear regression models with constant
coefficients (like equatíon 10), to interpret estimates of the retuzn to
schooling based on quarter of birth. In constant coefficient models, the
independence assumption requires only that the regression error term be mean-
independent of quarter of birth. Monotonicity (Assumption 2) is not required
because there is no treatment effect heterogeneity.
In the context of the model outlíned in Section 2 of this paper, the
Wald estímates in Table 2 should be interpreted as the average effect of a
one-year increase in schooling, for people whose schooling is influenced by
quarter of birth. This is a small group, not necessarily representative of
the entire population. To identify the ACR for this group, the monotonicity
conditíon requires that men born in the fourth quarter get at least as much
schoolíng as they would have had they been born ín the first quarter. If this
condition is satisfied, we can get some idea of the size and characteristics
of the group contributing to the ACR through the ACR weightíng function.
The CDF's of schooling by quarter of bírth for men in the 1970 and 1980
Censuses are graphed in Figures 1 and 2. Both figures show that the CDF for
men men born in the fourth quarter lies below the CDF for men born in the
fírst quarter. The weighting function underlying estimates of the ACR in25
Table 2 is proportional to the difference between the CDF of schooling for men
born in the first quarter and the CDF of schooling for men born in the fourth
quarter. For each level of schooling, j, this difference is the fraction of
the population whose schooling is switched by quarter of birth from less than
j years to at least j years.
Figures 3 and 4 show differences in the CDF of schooling by quarter of
birth. In each figure, the difference between the CDF of schooling for men
born in the lst and fourth quarters is plotted, along with 95 percent
confidence bands at each point.ll ACR weighting functions for estimates
based on comparisons between first and fourth quarter births are the CDF
differences plotted in the figures, normalized to sum to one.
The figures show that the groups contributing most to estimates of the
ACR based on quarter of birth are those with 8-12 years of schooling. There
is a sharp decline in the weighting function at 12 years of schooling. A
maximum of a líttle over 2 percent of the sample was induced by being born in
the fourth quarter to complete llth grade, but much smaller fractions were
induced to complete higher grades. This is not surprising since compulsory
attendance laws affect young students and cannot compel students to go to
college. Some weight is contributed by college attenders, however, perhaps
because some students forced by accident of birth to graduate high school
later decide to go on to college after all.
Figures 5 and 6 plot the contrast between schooling CDF's for birth
quarters 1-3 relative to fourth-quarter births. The figures show that
schooling CDF's are ordered by quarter of birth. This is evídence that any
11The difference between CDF's by quarter of birth is the difference
between two índependent sample proportions. The confidence bands are
calculated using the conventional formula for a difference in proportions.26
adjacent pair of quarters can be used to define a binary instrumental variable
that satisfies the monotonicity assumption. TSLS using three quarter of birth
dummíes ís a weighted average of the three possible Wald estimates based on
adjacent quarters of birth. TSLS estímates of the return to schooling in thís
case are .062 (standard error -.016) in the 1970 Census and .103 (standard
error -.020) in the 1980 Census. These are simílar to the Wald estimates
based on a comparison of first and fourth-quarter births.
The TSLS over-identification test statistics take on the values 2.35 aiid
2.85 in the two Census data sets. Both statistics have chi-square
distríbutíons with 2 degrees of freedom under the null hypothesís of constant
treatment effects and instrument-error orthogonality. These values therefore
cast little doubt on the constant treatment effect and independence
assumptions. Finally, the fact that the various instrumental variables and
TSLS estimates are so close to the OLS estimates suggest that naíve
comparisons of earnings by the level of educational attainment may have a
causal interpretation after all.
5. Summary and Conclusions
This paper defines the average causal response to variable treatments
such as drug dosage, cigarettes smoked, hours of study, and years of
schoolíng. The defínitíon ís motivated by Rubín's notion of counter-factual
outcomes ín evaluation research, and by our previous definition of Local
Average Treatment Effects for binary treatments. We show here that a weighted
average of per-unit casual responses to a change ín treatment intensity is
identifíed in a wide variety of models and círcumstances. The average
response we can identify ís for those indíviduals whose treatment status ís27
affected by an ínstrumental variable that is independent of potential outcomes
and potential treatment intensities. The monotonicity condition imposed when
deriving this result requires only that the inatrumental variable affect
treatment Lntensity Ln the same direction for each unít of observation.
We have presented a number of formulas for the weighting function that
underlíes instrumental variables estímates of average causal effects. These
formulas can help empirical researchers understand which observations are
contributing to a particular estimate. But we have not presented new
estimators, and, for researchers already using exogenous variation to estimate
treatment effects and causal responses, there is little here that should
affect empirical practice. Rather, our results provide a useful
interpretation for some of the simple estimators commonly employed in applied
reaearch. We also hope these results help build a bridge between the
econometric literature on evaluation and the evaluatíon literature in
biometrics, sociology, and other disciplines.
Finally, the most important issue in evaluation research is p~obably not
treatment effect heterogeneity, but whether the source of identifying
informatíon -- be it an intervention involving experimental random assignment,
or a natural experiment -- is really assocíated with the outcome of interest
solely because of assocíation with the treatment. After having made the case
for this link, however, it is important to recognize that data can only be
informative about the effect of treatment on those whose treatment status is
affected by the intervention. The Average Causal Response discussed in this
paper does this by setting out specific formulas for the anatomy of the causal
response to a varíable treatment.28
Table 1: Encouraged Teat Preparation
Hours of Preparation for the Analytical Section of the GRE'
Hours of Cumulatíve dsn. ACR Treatment Weighting





Pr(Do~j ) Pr(Di~j )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
0 0.0 0.0
0 .5 8.32 2.53 16.4 0-~ .5 Do ~.5 5 D1
~ 1 1.5 28.5 14.5 39.7 .5 -1 1.5 Do c 1.5 5 D1
1-2 4 57.1 45.4 33.1 1.5 -~ 4 Do G 4 C D1
3-5 6 80.2 76.4 10.8 4-~ 6 Do G 6 G D1
~ 6 100.0 100.0
mean score 509.7 531.8




'Column (1) shows the intervals for which hours of preparatíon are reported in
Powers and Swinton (19E4, Table 2.) Column (2) shows the value of the
variable treatment intensity assumed when reportíng the cumulatíve
distribution function. Columns 3 and 4 of the table show the cumulative
distribution of hours of preparation by encouragement-group. Column (5) shows
the ACR weights, equal to (3)-(4) normalízed to sum to one. Column (6) shows
the increase in treatment intensity to which the weight applies to. Column
(7) shows the sub-population the ACR weight refers to.
bStandard errors ín parentheses.29
Table 2: Compulaory School Attandance
Panel A: Wald Estimates for 1970 Census -- Men Born 1920-1929'
(1) (2) (3)
Born in Born in Difference
lst Quarter 2nd, 3rd, or (Std. Error)
of Year 4th Quarter (1) - (2)
of Year
ln (Wkly. Wage) 5.1485 5.1578 - 0.00935
(0.00374)
Education 11.3996 11.5754 -0.1758
(0.0192)








Panel B: Wald Estimates for 1980 Census -- Men Born 1930-1939
(1) (2) (3)
Born in Born in Difference
lst quarter 2nd, 3rd, or (std. error)
of year 4th quarter (1) - (2)
of year
ln (Wkly. Wage) 5.8916 5.9051 -0.01349
(0.00337)
Education 12.6881 12.8394 -0.1514
(0.0162)








'The sample size is 122,223 in Panel A, and 162,515 in Panel B. Each sample
consists of males born in the U.S. who had positive earnings in the year
preceding the survey. The 1980 Census sample is drawn from the SX sample, and
the 1970 Census sample is from the State, County and Neighborhoods 1X samples.30
A detaíled description of the data sets is províded in the Appendix to Angrist
and Krueger (1991.)
bThe OLS return to education was estimated from a bivariate regression of log
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